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1Introduction
by  MAT ThEW A.  ROSENSTEIN
This issue of Swords and Ploughshares represents 
the published results of a symposium held at the 
University of Illinois in late April 2008, which posed 
the question, “Can NATO Survive Afghanistan?” 
Since 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
has led the operation of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) to “establish conditions 
in which Afghanistan can enjoy a representative 
government and self-sustaining peace and security.” 
however, ISAF has struggled to bring stability to 
Afghanistan, prompting concerns about its chances 
for meeting those objectives. Moreover, senior U.S. 
officials referred in spring 2008 to a possible “existen-
tial crisis” for NATO, as a result of tensions within 
the alliance over member countries’ troop-level and 
mission task commitments to ISAF. Such statements 
could be viewed as political posturing prior to the 
April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, designed to 
leverage greater support from European allies for the 
Afghanistan campaign. Nevertheless, they cast light 
on several significant challenges facing NATO as it 
conducts its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic 
arena in its nearly sixty-year history. This issue exam-
ines those challenges in depth.
In the first article, Stanley Sloan proposes that 
the transatlantic strategic alliance needs repair after 
the “shock and awe unilateralism” of the George W. 
Bush presidency. Sloan rejects the notion that the 
current challenges facing NATO should be framed in 
terms of an existential threat. he argues instead that 
U.S. and European shared values and interests plus 
a lack of suitable alternative security alignments will 
help to ensure NATO’s sustainability. Sloan envisions 
multiple possible scenarios for the future course of 
US-European relations. The scenario promising the 
highest pay-offs, but which also comprises the biggest 
hurdles, will demand conscious efforts from leaders 
on both sides of the Atlantic to work towards greater 
policy convergence and new frameworks for coopera-
tive security.
In the next article, Ryan hendrickson acknowl-
edges the “uncharted political and military territory” 
accompanying NATO’s Afghanistan operation, but 
explains that criticism of the alliance’s performance 
in this specific engagement ignores NATO’s wider 
global security relevance. he deems NATO member-
ship expansion to twenty-six countries, with more 
aspiring countries in line, as successful. Coupled 
with the alliance’s growing numbers of partnerships 
with non-member countries and out-of-area mis-
sions, hendrickson sees signs of NATO’s appeal and 
effectiveness for various diplomatic and security tasks.
Next, Paul Diehl discusses several problems 
confronting NATO’s Afghanistan operation. he 
questions whether the current force structure is suit-
able for the wide range of sometimes incompatible 
peacekeeping mission tasks assigned to the troops, 
particularly when factoring in the specific demands 
of the Afghan conflict arena. he also explains how 
burden-sharing disputes among NATO members 
have hampered ISAF. Diehl notes the persistent man-
ifestation of such problems in one form or another 
throughout the alliance’s history, but nevertheless 
perceives a need for NATO’s carefully conceived 
evolution if it is to meet future challenges.
Edward Kolodziej’s contribution asserts that more 
is at stake in Afghanistan than simply the fate of 
NATO’s military campaign against the Taliban and 
al Qaeda, or for that matter the reconstruction of a 
country wracked by decades of conflict. The operative 
question, he contends, is not whether NATO can 
survive Afghanistan, but rather whether the coali-
tion of actors involved in stabilizing the country 
can demonstrate the requisite cohesiveness, military 
resolve, political will, and problem-solving capacities 
to not only prevail in Afghanistan but also confront a 
host of other global issues. Kolodziej concludes that 
how the free, democratic, market states and peoples 
perform their shared mission in Afghanistan and 
other parts of the world will do much to shape the 
security preoccupations of the twenty-first century 
global society. 
Several threads tie these articles together. All four 
authors remark on the seminal importance of the 
Afghan peace-building and reconstruction efforts in 
both symbolic and actual terms for stabilizing the 
broader global security system. Each either explicitly 
or implicitly acknowledges the need for respon-
sible global leadership from the United States and 
European countries in Afghanistan and beyond. And 
all four contributors agree that although the existing 
infrastructure of the transatlantic bargain—including 
but not exclusive to NATO—offers ongoing potential 
for success, some critical alterations must occur in the 
US-European relationship if the alliance members 
aspire to greater future effectiveness in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere.
Finally, I should note that the symposium and 
this publication were made possible through the col-
laborative efforts of ACDIS and the European Union 
Center at Illinois, and were partially supported by the 
EU Center’s U.S. Department of Education Title VI 
grant. Laura hastings and Ryan hendrickson deserve 
special mention, as they provided essential help con-
ceptualizing the project.
2Short Takes
For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed 
militia is their best security.
—Thomas Jefferson, Eighth Annual Message, November 8, 1808
[The Parties to this Treaty] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being 
in the North Atlantic area.
—The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949
My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what 
together we can do for the freedom of man.
—John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, January 20, 1961
There is no telling how many wars it will take to secure freedom in the homeland.
—President George W. Bush, August 7, 2002 speech
The United States has failed in Afghanistan and is attempting to bring more troops 
from European nations to this country just in order to hide its failure.
—Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, February 11, 2008
We face a crisis in Afghanistan that is extraordinarily difficult for our country and 
for the NATO alliance. For NATO, it may be an existential crisis.
—U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, February 2008, just before stepping down
3Articles
 Being a committed Atlan-
ticist does not mean that I 
think everything is right in 
the US-European relation-
ship. Things are broken or 
worn out, and need to be 
fixed or replaced.
 The bottom line is that 
NATO “survived” the Bush 
administration.
Why Should We Think NATO 
Can Survive Afghanistan?
by  STANLEy R.  SLOAN
The transatlantic alliance has just passed through 
one of the most difficult periods in the last sixty years 
of US-European relations. The factors contributing to 
the recent crisis may never occur in the same combi-
nation again. however, there is clearly some wisdom 
in trying to learn whatever lessons may be available 
to help understand and guide the relationship in the 
years ahead. 
Now, before the alliance can even celebrate 
surviving its latest near-death experience, it faces a 
new question: can it survive its difficult mission in 
Afghanistan? The task is to try to ensure that this 
“failed state” becomes, at a minimum, a relatively 
stable country in which a representative government 
is able to defend itself and provide for the needs of 
its people, ensuring that it will no longer serve as 
a launching pad for international terrorism or as a 
major source for the illicit international drug trade. 
Not an easy task, by any stretch of the imagination, 
and one likely to require many years of sustained 
effort.
The question addressed in this essay is whether the 
Bush administration-induced crisis that the alliance 
has just survived offers any guidance when asking 
whether or not NATO and transatlantic relations 
more generally can survive Afghanistan. This analysis 
concludes with a few modest predictions about the 
future of transatlantic relations. 
One American’s View
There are many “American” perspectives on Europe 
and transatlantic relations. Some Americans see 
Europe as the source of America’s most important 
allies, and the relationship as one that is critical 
to future US well-being economically, politically, 
and militarily. Other Americans have become quite 
cynical about Europe. Like Robert Kagan, they see 
Europe as “Venus” to America’s “Mars.”
In this latter view, Europe was once very impor-
tant to the United States. It was the source of many 
of our troubles in the last century, including two 
world wars. It became the key battleground in the 
struggle between the forces for freedom and democ-
racy on the one side and for soul-less, authoritarian 
communism on the other. 
however, in this view, while the United States was 
successfully leading this coalition in the Cold War, 
Europe was becoming flabby, relying on the United 
States for its defense while enjoying the good life of 
limited responsibilities and unlimited comforts. 
Of course, there are other perspectives as well. 
Some Americans, frankly, simply don’t care, or at least 
don’t see caring about transatlantic relations, one way 
or another, as being that important.
For my part, I admit to being a committed 
Atlanticist. 
What does this mean? For me, it means believ-
ing that a healthy, mutually beneficial transatlantic 
relationship is vitally important to the United States 
and to Europe as well. In the long run, Europeans 
will need us, and we will need them.
Now, being a committed Atlanticist does not 
mean that I think everything is right in the relation-
ship. Things are broken or worn out, and need to be 
fixed or replaced. 
In some respects, it has always been this way: I 
only have to look back at reports I wrote for Congress 
over twenty-five years to see how many times during 
the Cold War I wrote about “a crisis in the transat-
lantic alliance.” however, today, my view is that the 
relationship has suffered more than perhaps at any 
time since the end of the Second World War, and 
that it is sorely in need of repair. 
But it is also fair to say that, with new leadership 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the allies will have the 
opportunity, or perhaps more accurately, the chal-
lenge, to improve the situation in the coming years. 
Their first challenge will be to ensure that NATO sur-
vives its mission in Afghanistan. But before I address 
this problem, what can we learn from the recent crisis 
in the alliance?
George W. Bush and Europe
George W. Bush came to office with a virtual tabula 
rasa as far as Europe was concerned, and for that 
matter with regard to foreign policy more generally. 
however, the George W. Bush administration from 
day one applied shock and awe unilateralism to US-
European relations. The administration’s positions 
against US participation in the International Crimi-
nal Court, the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol 
were just a beginning.
4The 9/11 attacks were a brutal shock for the 
American people, but, ironically, they offered the 
administration a sense of direction it had been 
sorely lacking in its first year. More importantly, the 
president and his team had an historic opportunity 
to build a broad-based international coalition against 
terrorism. however, after 9/11, the United States 
virtually ignored initial allied and NATO offers of 
assistance. The action was even set in a telling phi-
losophy articulated by senior administration officials: 
for this administration, “the mission would determine 
the coalition.”
The Iraq war created huge political divisions in 
NATO and the European Union. According to one 
senior European diplomat, every capitol and ministry 
in Europe was seriously divided—even in countries 
that officially came down strongly on one side of the 
war debate or the other. Bush administration officials 
acted in ways intended to emphasize and deepen 
those divisions.
The Bottom Line
The bottom line, however, is that NATO apparently 
has “survived” the Bush administration. The alliance 
soldiers on, continuing to expand and leading the 
international community’s stabilization effort in 
Afghanistan in spite of the:
•	 starkly	unilateralist	policies	in	the	first	year	of	the	
administration; 
•	 “we	are	at	war”	mentality	and	the	fear	and	anger	
that captured American thinking and emotions 
following 9/11;
•	 explicit	rejection	by	the	Bush	administration	of	
Europe’s and NATO’s utility following the attacks;
•	 controversial	decision	to	attack	Iraq	and	the	
bungled operation there;
•	 manner	in	which	American	policies	and	attitudes	
divided European governments; and
•	 widespread	European	revulsion	at	George	W.	
Bush’s policies and his personality.
NATO’s survival cannot be explained in terms of 
the need for a response to an existential threat. Such 
a threat from the Soviet Union had been history for a 
decade before Bush came to office, and had not been 
reconstituted. It also cannot be explained in terms 
of European acceptance of the Bush administration’s 
argument following 9/11 that the United States and 
its allies were at war with radical Islamic extremism. 
That argument was not accepted by most Europeans.
however, there are other possible explanations. 
Without implying order of importance or general 
acceptance, they arguably include:
•	 the	fact	that,	in	spite	of	differences	over	Iraq	and	
international relations generally, the United States 
and its European allies still share an impressive 
collection of values and interests;
•	 US	behavior	during	the	Bush	administration	
appeared more revolutionary than it was, and 
Europe had already begun to get used to some of 
the inclinations in US policy toward unilateral-
ism and hegemonic behavior during the Clinton 
administration;
•	 European	governments	simply	had	no	alternative	
to remaining in alliance with the United States, 
and NATO was still the most important symbol 
and operational component of the relationship;
•	 failure	of	the	EU	constitution	to	win	popular	
acceptance suggested the arguments being made 
for the European Union to become a “balancer” 
of US power internationally—likely destroying 
NATO—could not be sustained by reality, at least 
in the near term;
•	 European	governments	remained	split	concern-
ing the future construction of Europe, and the 
default position (of European integration within 
the broader context of transatlantic cooperation) 
was sufficiently compelling to discourage other 
options;
•	 “new”	European	democracies	in	Eastern	and	
Central Europe were strongly committed to 
NATO’s continuation, particularly because their 
historical and geographic proximity to Russian 
power and influence convinced them that NATO 
provided an essential link to US power that was 
not provided by EU membership;
•	 European	governments	decided	that,	in	spite	of	
how difficult the relationship with the United 
States had become, there were no acceptable alter-
native power centers with which Europe could 
align;
•	 and,	the	financial	and	economic	fortunes	of	
the United States and Europe had become so 
mutually interdependent that a political/security 
break with the United States could put all vital 
European interests at risk.
All these arguments could be seen as part of the 
answer to the question “can NATO survive Afghani-
stan?” The answer would appear to be that, if NATO 
can survive George Bush, the allies can find a way to 
survive Afghanistan. A reason that could be added 
to the list above in the case of Afghanistan is that it 
is not only NATO’s future that is at risk in the moun-
tains of the hindu Kush. The future of the United 
Nations, the European Union and the overall ability 
of the international system to deal with failed states, 
terrorism, the illicit drug trade and the clash between 
traditional societies and modernization all hang in 
the Afghanistan balance. NATO is not alone in this 
challenge.
 European governments 
decided that, in spite of 
how difficult the relation-
ship with the United States 
had become, there were no 
acceptable alternative power 
centers with which Europe 
could align.
 A new burden-sharing 
debate could break out 
across the Atlantic with 
almost no effort at all.
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The bottom line of this relationship is that the United 
States, Canada and the European states seem to 
recognize that none of them can afford to go it alone 
internationally, even if future differences might tempt 
them to do so again down the road. 
The United States with which European leaders 
and states will have to deal in the foreseeable future 
will remain a de facto hegemon with the capacity to 
do much good or much harm in terms of their inter-
ests and international stability. “Europe” will remain 
a work in progress, acting united in many areas, but 
with EU members acting very much like nation states 
particularly in the areas of foreign and defense policy. 
Under these circumstances, US-European rela-
tions could go in a number of different directions 
under the new US administration that will come 
to office in 2009. For ease of discussion, let’s divide 
those possibilities into three broad categories: 
•	 new	burden-sharing	debate;
•	 muddling	through;
•	 building	a	new	foundation.
First, a new burden-sharing debate could break 
out across the Atlantic with almost no effort at all. 
Whether Democratic or Republican-led, the adminis-
tration taking office in the United States in 2009 will 
want the United States to do more in Afghanistan, 
but also will want the Europeans to do much more. 
Given the fact that most European allies believe they 
are at the limit of their resources with current com-
mitments, this situation could easily deteriorate into 
a transatlantic blame game. 
In this scenario, “who lost Afghanistan?” could be 
the question in a few years, and the question “who 
destroyed NATO?” would be close on its heels.
The second possible future is one of muddling 
through. This option would look a lot like the past 
three years, with a group of new players on both 
sides of the Atlantic building new resentments and 
whispered recriminations, but keeping the relation-
ship civil and ensuring that operations in Afghanistan 
do not totally collapse.
The third possible future is the most difficult to 
envision and produce, but also, in my opinion, the 
most important to seek. This approach could be 
referred to as “building a new foundation for trans-
atlantic relations.” The approach would be premised 
on the need for a combination of policy convergence 
among Euro-Atlantic nations, particularly on key 
security challenges; practice, especially mutually sup-
portive security efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere; 
and revised transatlantic posture, including construc-
tion of some new frameworks to strengthen US-
European and global cooperation on the non-military 
aspects of international challenges.
The most immediate challenge to allies on both 
sides of the Atlantic is to rebuild a constructive dia-
logue to replace the destructive interactions that have 
characterized handling of the Iraq issue. 
This will require the United States to “speak more 
softly,” as US President Teddy Roosevelt famously 
recommended. Everyone knows that the United 
States already carries the “biggest stick.” Future US 
administrations will be required to be more construc-
tive and creative in the use of international institu-
tions and multilateral cooperation. In short, the 
United States will have to learn how to be a hegemon 
without acting like one.
For their part, Europeans will have to bring 
more resources and capabilities to the transatlantic 
security table. Europe’s speaking softly while carrying 
a big carrot simply won’t cut it. The US–European 
relationship needs a better balance in terms of both 
authority and capability. however, it is not up to 
the United States to “give” Europe more authority. 
European nations and the European Union will wield 
greater influence in Washington and internationally 
based on their will and ability to contribute to solu-
tions of international security problems.
Given the current disparities between US and 
European military capabilities, some have suggested 
dividing responsibilities in the alliance. however, any 
formal division of responsibilities (hard power tasks 
for the United States, soft power jobs for the Europe-
ans) would be a disaster for US–European relations. 
It does make sense for individual nations, or 
groups of nations, to take on specific tasks within 
the overall framework of transatlantic cooperation. 
In fact, the special capacities that European allies 
have for managing stabilization and reconstruction 
activities could be usefully combined with the potent 
US ability for war fighting to develop a full spectrum 
of pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict coalition 
activities. This would require closer political and 
strategic cooperation and better integrated planning, 
including the will to imagine and project reactions 
to a wide range of contingencies. This would not 
be easy, but it would substantially enhance US and 
European capacities for dealing with future security 
challenges.
Any formal transatlantic division of responsibili-
ties, however, would create even bigger gaps between 
the United States and Europe concerning how best 
to respond to international security challenges. Such 
an approach would only encourage US tendencies 
toward the unilateral use of military force as well as 
European tendencies to believe that all problems can 
be solved without military force backing up diplo-
macy. In a world of divided Euro-Atlantic responsi-
bilities, responses to every future security challenge 
would have to overcome growing divergences in 
appreciation of the problem before effective coopera-
tion could even be imagined. 
 “Who lost Afghanistan?” 
could be the question in a 
few years, and the question 
“who destroyed NATO?” 
would be close on its heels.
 The United States will 
have to learn how to be a 
hegemon without acting like 
one.
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division of tasks among the transatlantic partners, 
but not a formal division of labor across the Atlantic. 
Ideally, both American and European forces should 
be engaged in the high intensity and lower intensity 
ends of future conflicts, sharing responsibility for the 
strategies required for the entire continuum.
The Likely Future
In mid-2007, I participated in a conference in 
Norway sponsored by the Oslo Nobel Institute. My 
assignment was to draft a concluding US perspective 
for the book that would be produced by the confer-
ence papers. 
I carefully avoided predictions, following the 
advice of the many wise individuals who have said, in 
one way or another, “making predictions is difficult, 
particularly when they are about the future.” 
however, the Institute’s director and expert on 
transatlantic relations, Geir Lundestad, was not going 
to let me get away with that. he asked that I produce 
my best guesses about the directions the transatlantic 
relationship would take for the next period of history. 
My best guesses follow.
First, I said that the United States most likely 
would remain the most important global power. 
Nevertheless, I suggested, other countries and 
groupings of countries would gain in relative power 
and influence, including the European Union. This 
emerging reality will progressively be reflected in the 
US approach to its international role.
The European Union will neither be transformed 
into a United States of Europe nor fall apart at the 
seams. It will continue to evolve toward a “United 
Europe of States,” but will find it difficult to define its 
borders, including most notably the question of how 
to link Turkey to the integration process. 
I concluded that global developments would 
increasingly demonstrate the interdependence of 
the problems affecting US and European interests. 
Emerging and influential economic, political and 
strategic players, including China and a resur-
gent Russia, will increase pressure on the United 
States and Europe to develop compatible strategic 
perspectives.
The requirement for enhanced US-European 
cooperation will highlight the deficiencies of existing 
transatlantic institutions. NATO will continue as 
the institution that manages US-European military 
cooperation, and as a symbol of US-European shared 
strategic interests. however, policy-makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic will search for approaches that go 
beyond simply muddling through.
Even if “muddling through” is the principle modus 
vivendi for the next period of history, the transatlan-
tic relationship will occupy a special and critically 
 The European Union will 
neither be transformed into 
a United States of Europe 
nor fall apart at the seams. 
It will continue to evolve 
toward a “United Europe of 
States.”
 Neither the United States 
nor the European nations 
will be able to identify more 
effective, compatible, or 
reliable partners among 
other global players.
important place in the foreign and security policies of 
the United States and the European democracies.
The United States will continue to need its 
European friends and allies to help deal with a wide 
range of global issues and will benefit both from the 
material support that they can supply as well as the 
political legitimacy that the United States needs. 
The international community, led by the United 
States and the European countries, will most likely 
have to sustain a presence in Afghanistan for many 
years to come. Success or failure there will continue 
to be seen as a test of US-European cooperation as 
well as of the effectiveness of international institu-
tions, including the United Nations, NATO and the 
European Union, in dealing with international secu-
rity challenges. For NATO’s future health, risks and 
responsibilities there will have to be shared equitably 
among the allies.
The European states, individually and collectively, 
will find their interests best served by continued 
cooperation with the United States, in part because 
they will continue to share important core values 
and interests with the United States and because 
cooperation will enhance the international influence 
of European countries and provide channels through 
which they can exert influence on a country whose 
actions so directly affect European interests.
The bottom line is that neither the United States 
nor the European nations will be able to identify 
more effective, compatible, or reliable partners 
among other global players. At the end of the day, the 
quality of the transatlantic relationship will depend 
to a great degree on the choices made by leaders on 
both sides of the Atlantic, particularly regarding the 
mission in Afghanistan. 
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7granted to seven European states, which included 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slova-
kia, and Slovenia. These changes produced an alliance 
in 2004 of twenty-six member states, which is consid-
erably different from the original twelve allies who 
came together in 1949, as Secretary General Lord 
Ismay noted, to “get the United States in, keep the 
Soviets out and keep the Germans down.” 
In these two expansion rounds, critics noted that 
the applicant states provided little added security 
value to the allies, and more dangerously, potentially 
invited new security pressures for the alliance. Argu-
ably, more members would make it more difficult to 
achieve alliance consensus, and these new members 
had internal political problems of their own, 
especially with regard to the political integration of 
large domestic minority populations. Critics within 
military circles highlighted the applicants’ outdated 
weaponry, their inability to project force, and the 
high costs of making their militaries interoperable 
with the rest of the allies. For the most part, academic 
commentators and policy analysts argued that expan-
sion was a bad idea that would bring serious harm to 
the alliance. 
yet now, more than ten years after the Madrid 
Summit and six years after Prague, it is clear that 
NATO expansion has been a success. The new 
member countries have rarely been an obstacle to 
finding consensus in the alliance, and have managed 
their domestic minority populations in democratic 
and fair manners. Much research also points to the 
significant defense reforms that applicants have 
implemented in their efforts to become more attrac-
tive to NATO, and the positive democratic changes 
adopted in necessary civil-military reforms. Of par-
ticular note is Alexandra Gheciu’s book, NATO in the 
“New Europe,” which makes a convincing case that 
both the Czech Republic and Romania responded to 
diplomatic pressure and ongoing training assistance 
from NATO to implement the kind of reforms that 
the alliance sought from its applicant states. Rachel 
Epstein’s research makes a similarly strong case that 
democratic and military reforms have been imple-
mented in Poland, the Baltics, and elsewhere as states 
work toward gaining membership in the alliance. 
Moreover, while the new members have generally 
provided only small equipment and troop contribu-
tions to Afghanistan and other NATO peacekeep-
ing operations, and their small defense budgets 
have changed little since becoming full members, a 
number of their deployments have not been negli-
gible, and in some cases have made important contri-
butions to NATO’s broader peacekeeping mission. 
A number of these positive trends were again 
evident at NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008. 
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine 
all campaigned aggressively for NATO membership 
in the lead-up to the Summit. Although the level of 
 NATO’s Afghanistan 
mission places the alliance 
in uncharted political and 
military territory.
 Today’s twenty-six 
member NATO alliance is 
considerably different from 
the original twelve allies 
who came together in 1949, 
as Secretary General Lord 
Ismay noted, to “get the 
United States in, keep the 
Soviets out and keep the 
Germans down.”
 Despite the wider 
criticisms of the alliance’s 
alleged current condition, it 
seems clear that the move-
ment toward membership 
expansion has worked.
Many analysts have recently maintained that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is at a 
crossroads. These views tend to be shaped by at least 
three bodies of criticism toward the alliance. One 
view maintains that Europe and the United States 
no longer share similar cultural and political views. 
Another perspective maintains that the war in Iraq 
drove this alleged transatlantic wedge even deeper, 
and that recovery from the war and American uni-
lateralism will take decades. More recently, the new 
crisis dominating much of the literature on NATO 
involves its mission in Afghanistan, which began in 
2003 and has introduced a new set of political, strate-
gic and military problems for the allies to overcome. 
Although senior officials within NATO continue to 
note some of the progress being made in NATO’s 
Afghanistan operation, it is clear that the mission 
places the alliance in uncharted political and military 
territory. 
Many of these criticisms of NATO, especially 
those that point to the challenges in Afghanistan, 
have real merit and certainly give insight into the 
immediate and perhaps even long-term challenges 
faced by what many refer to as the world’s greatest 
military alliance. At the same time, other evidence 
indicates that NATO remains quite alive with 
real security relevance across the globe. This essay 
examines three facets of NATO’s missions beyond 
Afghanistan that often get overlooked by NATO’s 
critics, including the politics of NATO membership 
enlargement, the development of “global partners,” 
and the wider array of operations that the alliance is 
engaged in. In doing so, this essay provides a more 
comprehensive assessment of NATO’s current role 
in global security, and maintains that NATO’s critics 
who focus solely on the mission in Afghanistan miss 
critical foreign policy and security developments 
elsewhere in the world, which provides much insight 
on NATO’s ability to maintain its wider relevance 
in global security. NATO has serious problems to 
overcome in Afghanistan, but these problems alone 
do not define the alliance’s future. This essay begins 
by first turning to the political impact of membership 
enlargement. 
Alliance Enlargement 
In 1997 at its Madrid Summit, NATO extended 
membership invitation offers to three Central 
European states: the Czech Republic, hungary and 
Poland. This round of expansion was followed in 
2002 at the Prague Summit, as invitation offers were 
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8reforms vary across each state, it is clear that these 
aspiring members have all worked in coordination 
with NATO officials to professionalize and modernize 
their militaries, and in some cases, have implemented 
significant reforms to appeal to NATO. The Bucha-
rest Summit ended with invitations extended to 
Albania and Croatia, and with an invitation to Mace-
donia being placed on temporary hold, contingent 
upon its reconciliation with Greece over the country’s 
formal name. Differences within the alliance surfaced 
over the wisdom in inviting Georgia and Ukraine 
into NATO’s Membership Action Program at this 
time, but the alliance stressed the potential for future 
membership for them, as both states lobbied aggres-
sively for a closer relationship with the allies. After 
the Summit, increased lobbying efforts from NATO 
allies and applicant states have continued on behalf 
of Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine, all of which 
suggests the ongoing attractiveness of alliance mem-
bership. Despite the wider criticisms of the alliance’s 
alleged current condition that permeates much of the 
academic literature, it seems clear that the movement 
toward membership expansion has worked, that 
NATO’s “Open-Door” policy remains as a meaning-
ful facet of NATO’s evolution, and that many states 
continue to aggressively court NATO in their desire 
to gain membership. 
Global Partners 
During his tenure as NATO’s secretary general, Jaap 
de hoop Scheffer has actively campaigned beyond 
NATO’s traditional borders for a broadening of 
NATO “partners,” who agree to work alongside the 
alliance in carrying out its global mission to fight ter-
rorism. De hoop Scheffer and other NATO officials 
have made the case that the challenge of terrorism 
demands global cooperation and a strengthening of 
multilateral responses; the effort to thwart terrorist 
movements cannot be viewed through only a regional 
lens, as NATO must go beyond its traditional borders 
to cultivate new partners who can aid the alliance 
in achieving this security objective. In doing so, 
under De hoop Scheffer’s leadership, NATO has 
forged new diplomatic relationships with Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, all of whom 
have found ways to assist NATO with Afghani-
stan. Among these states, Australia is perhaps most 
noteworthy given its contribution to the operation in 
Afghanistan of some 1100 troops, who are deployed 
in the more contentious southern region. 
Another notable partner of NATO is Sweden, 
who is famous for its long-standing position of 
foreign policy neutrality. In reality, Sweden has been 
anything but neutral with regard to NATO, and has 
found a number of means to increase its coopera-
tion with the allies. Sweden currently has 350 troops 
deployed in Afghanistan, has trained alongside 
NATO’s Response Force, has worked in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace program since 1995, and has 
approximately 200 troops deployed in NATO’s 
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. Similarly, 
although domestic public opinion remains skeptical 
of expanding ties with NATO, a number of foreign 
policy elites in Finland have begun to call for increas-
ing the public dialogue for improved relations with 
NATO. Although small in number, Finland also has 
100 of its own troops deployed in Afghanistan. These 
developments again stand in strong contrast to the 
wider criticisms waged against NATO and its current 
condition, and again suggests the ongoing attractive-
ness of the alliance and its role in global security—
even in Scandinavia where foreign policy neutrality is 
clearly being replaced by a movement toward de facto 
partnership with the allies.  
In the Middle East, NATO’s outreach efforts 
have also been responded to generally in a favorable 
way. At its 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO created 
its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which provided a 
new forum for NATO to increase its diplomatic con-
tacts with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab 
Emirates. In late April 2008, all NATO ambassadors 
and a number of NATO officials met for the second 
time in Bahrain to continue this dialogue. Bahrain 
has also agreed to more closely share intelligence 
with the allies, and has participated in joint military 
training operations. These new diplomatic relation-
ships should not be exaggerated, but nonetheless 
demonstrate that the alliance continues to evolve and 
find additional ways to cultivate different kinds of 
partnerships in areas where NATO previously would 
have never even considered. This same argument 
applies as well to Israel, which has participated in an 
array of NATO training operations. 
To be sure, NATO’s new global “partners” have 
not developed into official membership status talks 
for any of these states, and views within the alliance 
are mixed on how aggressive the organization should 
be in cultivating these new diplomatic relationships. 
France especially has expressed concern, and in 2007, 
openly protested an American-led “Global Partner-
ship Initiative” that would have more formally linked 
these non-members to the alliance. yet these mixed 
views within NATO have not prevented a deepening 
of dialogue and improved relations with these part-
ners, and again suggest that despite what its critics 
highlight, NATO remains attractive to a number of 
states outside the alliance for an array of diplomatic 
and security reasons.   
Expansion of NATO Operations 
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan continues to take 
primacy over all other alliance operations, a point 
which has repeatedly been highlighted by Jaap de 
hoop Scheffer and was again noted in NATO’s 
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9Bucharest Summit Declaration. yet even with the alli-
ance increasingly engaged in Afghanistan, it is clear 
that the alliance has continued to evolve in response 
to new security challenges beyond alliance borders. In 
2005, NATO agreed to assist the African Union (AU) 
in transporting peacekeeping troops to Sudan. In the 
same year, NATO also assisted the United Nations 
and some humanitarian non-governmental organi-
zations in the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
to earthquake victims in Pakistan. In both cases, 
evidence exists that these operations were entered 
with considerable caution and some hesitancy, but 
NATO nonetheless was called upon and eventually 
responded to these security needs. 
In 2005, after considerable debate within the alli-
ance, NATO agreed to place a small group of military 
experts to train senior Iraqi defense officials. Other 
NATO members have provided similar military 
advice and training on a bilateral basis. Although this 
operation remains small, consisting of only ninety 
NATO trainers, and also highlights the different 
views existing within NATO over Iraq, Prime Minis-
ter Nouri Al-Maliki recently visited NATO head-
quarters in Brussels and reiterated his requested for a 
wider NATO presence in Iraq. In this respect, NATO 
is demonstrating its different kinds of capabilities that 
it can potentially provide, which Iraqi leaders want. 
More recently, the rapidly deteriorating political 
climate in Somalia demonstrates how NATO is being 
called upon to provide other kinds of assistance. In 
2008, NATO has again agreed to provide transport 
assistance to AU peacekeeping troops. Moreover, 
Somalia’s coastal waters have become ripe for Somali 
pirates, who recently took a Spanish merchant ship 
hostage, which triggered Spain’s calls for NATO to 
consider an active naval policing role in the region. 
NATO also maintains its peacekeeping presence of 
16,000 troops in Kosovo, and by many accounts, 
continues to foster stability in the wake of the recent 
secessionist and independence movement.   
This wide variety of military operations dem-
onstrates that NATO has ongoing and increasing 
relevance in addressing an array of existing security 
challenges. Among the explanations for this expand-
ing role, Celeste Wallander’s research published in the 
journal International Organization in 2000 makes a 
strong case that NATO is an institution with a variety 
of political and military assets. Although the orga-
nization was created primarily to defend against an 
attack from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
its long history of joint and diversified training opera-
tions have allowed it to demonstrate its institutional 
flexibility and ability to evolve to meet new post Cold 
War challenges. 
In addition to Wallander’s views, John Duffield 
maintained in an article published in 1994 in Political 
Science Quarterly that NATO benefits from a dearth 
of other multilateral military organizations that are 
capable of responding to the diverse set of global 
security challenges that are now present. Even though 
his article is now over a decade old, his argument 
continues to have much merit, as the world watches 
the African Union struggle in Sudan and Somalia, 
and as the European Union is only able to conduct 
relatively small and limited peacekeeping operations. 
These EU operations, in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and now in Chad, also demonstrate 
the necessity of French military leadership, and thus 
implicitly, the EU’s institutional military and peace-
keeping limitations, which French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy has highlighted on a number of occasions. 
In addition to Wallander’s and Duffield’s insights, 
it seems clear that many security crises continue 
to prompt calls for multilateral responses, which 
likely become possible only due to the existence of 
multilateral institutions such as NATO. In a number 
of the security crises noted above, it is difficult to 
imagine resolving the crises with unilateral interven-
tion, which would have been objected to by the 
governments where the crises occurred, and may have 
not been supported domestically by the states who 
were providing the assistance. For all of these reasons, 
NATO continues to be called upon for assistance, 
and this trend seems likely to continue in the future. 
Afghanistan
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan faces tremendous 
political challenges. The surge in opium production 
and growth of the narco-economy, the increased 
levels of violence and suicide terrorism, the uneven 
military contributions from the allies, and the 
Europeans’ inadequate military capabilities have all 
brought out the difficult challenges for the allies. 
however one measures “success” in Afghanistan, it is 
clear that NATO is engaged in a long-term challenge 
that will continue to produce divisions within the 
alliance. 
yet even with these challenges, the mission 
continues to receive strong endorsement from the 
United Nations Security Council. In addition, while 
the military contributions are uneven within the 
alliance, NATO’s decision-making body, the North 
Atlantic Council, continues to support all elements 
of NATO’s peacekeeping and combat presence. Forty 
countries, including all NATO allies, contribute 
to the mission, and no NATO ally has removed its 
troops from the operation. While the troop contribu-
tions fall short of what NATO officials seek, member 
states have slowly added and built upon their exist-
ing presence. France, under President Sarkozy, is 
especially noteworthy given his decision to increase 
France’s military presence by more than 1,000 
troops. Sarkozy has also repositioned French aircraft 
such that they are able to more actively participate 
in combat operations. While the challenges in 
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Afghanistan are profound, the evidence is clear that 
the mission has considerable legitimacy and inter-
national support. When these more positive trends 
are placed alongside NATO’s success in membership 
enlargement, its growth in new “partner” allies, and 
the organization’s institutional flexibility and wider 
set of military assets that are relevant to current polit-
ical crises, it seems evident that NATO’s struggles in 
Afghanistan do not completely define its relevance in 
modern global security affairs.   
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Looking back at the problems and controversies 
that dogged NATO twenty-five or thirty years ago, 
a number of them are now artifacts of the cold war. 
Disputes over nuclear targeting doctrine and the 
deployment of intermediate range nuclear (INF) 
missiles in Europe were the subject of much political 
debate within and outside the alliance. Although 
these issues are faded, others have persisted including 
those related to American leadership in NATO and 
the enlargement of the alliance. In this essay, I focus 
on two multidimensional problems for NATO that 
have been manifest during its operation in Afghani-
stan (the International Security Assistance Force or 
ISAF): force suitability and burden sharing. Each 
of the concerns has arisen periodically throughout 
NATO’s history. Nevertheless, the repetition of these 
issues over time, albeit in different forms, suggests 
that they have implications beyond the present 
Afghan operation.
Force Suitability
In earlier decades, NATO debates centered on dif-
ferent types of nuclear and conventional forces and 
whether their type, size, and configuration were suffi-
cient for deterrence and defense. With the disintegra-
tion of the Warsaw Pact and the assumption of new 
missions by NATO forces, the old debates are largely 
moot. Nevertheless, the adoption of peace operations, 
or what NATO and others call “stability and support 
missions,” has reawakened concerns about the match 
between NATO forces and the tasks they are sup-
posed to achieve. As the oft-quoted phrase of former 
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld indicates, 
NATO is carrying out its missions in Afghanistan 
with the national armies it has rather than the forces 
that it wishes it had.
Problems of Context	•	NATO	forces	were	configured	
and trained primarily for conflict within the context 
of an interstate war. Afghanistan presents a very 
different context. It is essentially a civil war with the 
battleground extending to, and sometimes across, 
the Pakistani border. NATO forces face counterin-
surgency tasks as well as facing bombings and other 
terrorist acts. The civil war context and the geography 
of the deployment pose special problems for NATO 
and indeed any agency charged with carrying out a 
peace operation in similar contexts.
Civil conflicts pose special problems for peace 
operations, and especially for NATO in Afghani-
stan. Civil conflicts often involve more than two 
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Vast amounts of territory to cover are not the only 
problem for the NATO peace operation. Topog-
raphy must also be conducive to monitoring and 
other operational activities. An open terrain and a 
lightly populated area are conducive to the detec-
tion of improper activity by disputants. If the parties 
believe that they can get away with violations, then 
sniper fire, smuggling, and other actions will be more 
likely to occur. Afghanistan’s terrain is very rugged, 
and many villages are remote from the national 
capital Kabul. Inclement winter weather also causes 
problems for the peace operations and represents 
something of a “homefield” advantage for the Taliban 
and other insurgent elements. This is not to say that 
an urban warfare environment would necessarily 
be preferable, as US forces in Iraq understand well. 
Still, the deployment areas for NATO troops are not 
friendly to the different missions that need to be 
performed, and stand in contrast to flat, open desert 
areas, the terrain of the Sinai where many NATO 
countries contribute troops to the Multinational 
Force and Observers (MFO) operation.
The problems with carrying out peace operations 
in civil war contexts are not unique to NATO. Any 
agency, including other regional organizations and 
the United Nations, are subject to similar difficulties. 
yet neither is NATO immune. As NATO continues 
its evolution from a standard military alliance com-
mitted to conventional deterrence and defense in the 
central European theatre to a regional organization 
carrying out multiple missions “out of area,” its force 
structure will need further modifications to adapt to 
new situational contexts. 
Problems of Multiple and Incompatible Missions	•	 
The mandate for ISAF includes several different 
missions. Along with some conventional military 
components, there are several other missions that are 
often included in contemporary peacebuilding opera-
tions. The problem arises in that the missions may be 
incompatible with one another, from operational as 
well as training standpoints.
Several of the mission tasks assigned to the ISAF 
force might be described as requiring neutral roles 
in which the soldiers are only third parties in the 
conflict; the former means that the force is not inher-
ently biased or supportive of any local combatant 
whereas the latter indicates that ISAF is not an active 
participant in the dispute or conflict. Supporting 
humanitarian assistance operations and assisting in 
reconstruction needs (e.g., rehabilitation of medical 
facilities, restoring water supplies) are consistent with 
this orientation. At the same time, ISAF’s mandate 
includes tasks that are of a distinctly non-neutral 
character, specifically those parts of the mission that 
involve the development of the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF). These include conducting 
military operations with those forces, training the 
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identifiable groups in conflict. In Afghanistan, there 
are not merely national government forces and the 
Taliban, but various tribal militias whose support of 
NATO objectives varies across the different groups as 
well as time. As the number of actors in the dispute 
increases so does the likelihood that one or more of 
them will object to a cease-fire and the objectives 
of the peace forces; they may take military action 
against other actors (e.g., other militias, humanitarian 
assistance personnel) or NATO troops. Thus, there 
is more potential for “spoilers” in civil conflicts than 
interstate ones. 
Beyond the difficulty of aggregating multiple 
preferences in support of a peace operation, the geo-
graphic requirements are different in a civil conflict 
than in an interstate one. Civil instability means that 
several groups are operating in different parts of the 
country. This necessitates that the peace operation 
covers a broader territory, opening up the possibility 
of more violent incidents. Furthermore, unlike an 
identifiable international border or cease-fire line, it 
may be impossible to demarcate a line or area that 
separates the many sides in the conflict. The battle 
lines in Afghanistan are ill-defined and warfare is 
far from conventional. Suicide bombings or mortar 
attacks may be equally likely threats. The only clear 
border, Afghanistan’s with Pakistan, is actually a hin-
drance rather than a help to NATO forces; Pakistan 
provides a safe haven for the Taliban to supply its 
forces and to escape when pursued by American and 
NATO troops.
Not wearing military uniforms (indeed, some-
times not being traditional military or para-military 
units at all), participants in the Afghan civil conflict 
are hard to identify, much less to separate when they 
occupy the same geographic area. In contrast, dispu-
tants that can be more easily identified and separated 
across recognized borders or militarily defined cease-
fire lines, such as Serb forces along Kosovo’s borders, 
are much easier to regulate. 
The geography of civil conflicts may be quite 
dangerous to peace forces and the situation more 
difficult to control. Peace missions are most success-
ful when deployed so as to detect cease-fire viola-
tions and monitor compliance with other mandates 
adequately. Often this is well beyond the control 
of the operation. Afghanistan is an extremely large 
country, 647,500 square kilometers, sharing borders 
with six other states in Asia. Even with an extremely 
large peace force, it is largely impractical to secure all 
areas of the country. In fact, ISAF has only 1/80 the 
number of soldiers per kilometer and twenty times 
fewer soldiers per capita in terms of local popula-
tion than operations in Kosovo. The weak state of 
Afghan national forces provides limited supplemental 
assistance to NATO troops. Furthermore, a limited 
transportation system further complicates the ability 
of an international force to monitor activities. 
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national army, helping disarm opposition groups, and 
assisting in counter-narcotics operations. These are 
clearly actions in which NATO can and does assume 
primary party roles in the conflict. 
how well can NATO perform missions that 
are quite different from one another in role and 
conflict orientation? Complicating this, there is some 
disagreement among NATO members about the 
relative priority that should be assigned to recon-
struction versus security functions. Most soldiers 
receive extensive military training in basic combat 
skills. These may be fine for some peace operation 
activities on the coercive end of the scale. yet other 
missions depend for their effectiveness on a complex 
set of what has been referred to as “contact” (more 
diplomatic) skills. For example, missions whose 
primary purpose is monitoring call for observational 
and analytical skills. Those that attempt to restore 
countries to functioning civil societies (peace-
building) require a much broader range of skills, 
including interpersonal and intergroup relations, 
communication, negotiation, and, in the case of 
military operations, a mix of combat and political 
skills. A key question, however, is whether NATO 
soldiers are actually being trained in these contact 
skills, and this varies significantly by member state 
and the extent of peacekeeping experience of the 
soldiers involved. Can a given soldier master all 
the skills and behaviors necessary for the missions 
above, assuming that present or expanded training 
regimens could accommodate them? Will training 
in one approach undermine the training required 
in another approach? Another concern is with the 
ability of soldiers to shift orientations and tech-
niques as the mission evolves. 
More critically, the local population or the 
combatants may also have difficulty in deciding 
whether to cooperate with peace soldiers when they 
perform divergent and seemingly contradictory mis-
sions, such as humanitarian assistance and pacifica-
tion. Indeed, as civilian casualties have increased 
in Afghanistan, often from strategic bombing 
attacks, local support for NATO forces and actions 
has declined. Further complicating this is that the 
United States maintains a military operation—
Operation Enduring Freedom—separate from the 
ISAF operation. The former includes traditional 
military units and special operations personnel. It is 
unlikely that the coercive actions by American forces 
can be separated from neutral support for public 
goods (e.g., building roads), at least in the minds of 
Afghan warlords and local populations. 
NATO is likely to assume increasingly complex 
missions with multiple tasks that require different 
roles and conflict orientations. The Afghan experi-
ence suggests that NATO will need to make some 
adjustments in its training and mission specifica-
tion. Some of the problems might be solved by 
assigning some of the peacebuilding functions to 
units from certain designated countries and saving 
more coercive tasks to other NATO members. yet 
this exacerbates some of the burdening sharing prob-
lems elucidated below. It may also mean that greater 
reliance on non-governmental organizations and 
other entities for some peacebuilding functions may 
be necessary. The United Nations, specifically its 
UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), 
has been underutilized. Of course, such actors need 
to have a secure environment in which to operate, 
complicating the ability of NATO to escape from 
this dilemma.
Burden Sharing
During the cold war period, there was great debate 
in NATO over the distribution of contributions to 
the common defense. Most notably, American com-
mentators and politicians claimed that the United 
States was bearing a disproportionate burden and that 
the European allies were “free-riding,” and therefore 
not paying their share. Traditionally, gaps in defense 
spending/GNP between the United States and its 
allies were cited as evidence. Accordingly, there 
were numerous symbolic attempts by the American 
Congress to pressure the Europeans to spend more 
on defense, including failed Senate resolutions to 
withdraw US troops from Europe unless the allies 
increased contributions.
With the end of the cold war and the dissipation 
of the security threat from the east, defense spend-
ing concerns have been less salient in the alliance. 
Furthermore, the expansion of NATO has increased 
the potential pool of support on which to draw for 
any operation. Nevertheless, defense burden concerns 
have been reawakened in NATO for its operation 
in Afghanistan. Rather than defense spending per 
se, it is troop contributions that are now a source of 
controversy.
Table 1 lists troop contributions to the ISAF 
operation from NATO members and other states. 
The United States contributes over 40 percent of the 
military forces in this mission. This figure actually 
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Table 1: Troop Contributions to ISAF
NATO Member Troop Contribution
United States 19,000*
United Kingdom 7,750
Germany 3,490
Canada 2,500
All Others—37 states 
(including non-members)
14,260
Total 47,000
As of April 2008
*does not include military personnel in Operation Enduring Freedom
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underestimates the full contribution of the United 
States to the war in Afghanistan; beyond the official 
19,000 troops committed to ISAF, the US also has 
more than 13,000 troops under the separate, but 
coordinated, Operating Enduring Freedom fighting 
the Taliban and hunting insurgents in the eastern 
part of the country. There is also a large American 
civilian contingent. Leaving aside whether the size of 
this contribution is appropriate or not, it is clear that 
the United States has continued to carry most of the 
operational burden, even after NATO expanded its 
responsibilities in 2003. Beyond the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Canada—two other large 
contributors—have been most vocal about the rela-
tive imbalance of their contributions vis-à-vis other 
members. 
We know from analyses of “public goods,” 
those benefits that cannot be excluded from group 
members regardless of contribution, that certain 
states will almost always bear a disproportionate share 
of the costs of the goods. Absent a central govern-
ment to enforce contributions (e.g., taxes), this is 
difficult to avoid. In addition, NATO’s principle 
of “costs lie where they fall” means that states have 
an incentive not to contribute more troops and 
equipment, lest they assume the full costs of those 
contributions (in contrast to UN peacekeeping costs, 
which are shared by all members). Nevertheless, there 
will always be certain group members, in this case the 
United States, that have a private interest in provid-
ing the good even at the expense of paying more 
than its share. This does not necessarily lessen the 
controversy over differential contributions.
Adding to the conflict over personnel contribu-
tions are disputes over the deployment of those 
troops. Some states have resisted the deployment 
of their troops in areas of instability and in combat 
roles. Thus, not only have some states contributed 
fewer troops than might be predicted by their size, 
but NATO members have been reluctant to place 
personnel in harm’s way. Specifically, troops from 
Italy, Spain, and Germany are restricted to northern 
Afghanistan, an area of greater stability and less risk 
to those deployed than in the southern part of the 
country. 
Some form of specialization within NATO is 
logical given differential capabilities of national 
armies. yet when force allocations and restrictions 
are based on domestic political concerns to avoid 
casualties, tensions are bound to increase between 
alliance members. The net effect is that NATO risks 
becoming a two-tiered alliance with different roles 
and burdens for different states. As Robert Kaplan 
pointed out in an op-ed in the New York Times 
(2008), this is not necessarily undesirable and indeed 
could have a number of benefits. Nevertheless, it is 
likely to promote contention in the alliance unless 
such differential roles emerge from collective negotia-
tion and agreement, rather than unilateral national 
actions.
The tensions over defense burdens have been 
exacerbated by several, interrelated factors. First, the 
US and UK are already stretched to the military limit 
from military commitments in Iraq and therefore 
are more sensitive to increased burdens elsewhere. 
Second, the loss of gains in security in Afghanistan 
made in the early years of the operation has high-
lighted the need for more troops, not fewer to meet 
increasing threats. Although Afghanistan does not yet 
resemble Iraq in terms of security (or lack thereof ), 
the situation has deteriorated over the past year and 
only a few states have responded to calls for more 
troop contributions. Third, and in a related fashion, 
the prospects for a long deployment have dampened 
enthusiasm for continuing contributions, much less 
expanding commitments even as the latter may be 
necessary to fulfill the operation’s mandate. Even 
optimistic assessments envision ISAF deployment 
until at least 2011, and such predictions have been 
notoriously inaccurate in the past with respect to 
Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO members, and their 
domestic publics, are reluctant to undertake what are 
essentially open-ended commitments to a conflict at 
a great distance from their homelands. Finally, rising 
casualties (greater in 2007 than in previous years) has 
raised the cost of contributions to NATO. Rocket 
attacks and terrorist bombing have raised the stakes 
for NATO members and further encouraged states to 
restrict use of their troops and set deadlines for troop 
withdrawals.
Conclusion
The problems of force suitability and burden sharing 
have been manifest in different forms over the life of 
the NATO alliance. One possible implication is that 
the persistence of such issues is not a threat to the 
alliance itself. They did not bring down the alliance 
before and are unlikely to do so now. Of course, 
during the cold war era, these concerns were not 
viewed as serious enough to lead to a reevaluation 
of security commitments in the face of a common 
external threat. In the absence of a common external 
threat and a greater divergence of interests between 
members, problems in NATO deserve renewed atten-
tion and negotiation. They will certainly reappear 
as NATO conducts future operations divorced from 
its original mandate and away from its geographic 
center.
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Will the coalition of free, democratic, market states 
and peoples survive Afghanistan?
Currently, and misleadingly given the high stakes 
at risk, the Afghan challenge has been narrowly cast 
as whether NATO can survive Afghanistan. NATO, 
as a military organization, is a necessary but scarcely 
a sufficient condition to defeat the Taliban and their 
al Qaeda allies in Afghanistan and to cope with the 
multiplying challenges of the twenty-first century. 
What is needed is the creation of a new alliance of 
democratic states and peoples extending around the 
globe. Before that ambitious transformation of global 
politics can be entertained, a new administration 
in Washington must pointedly repudiate the Bush 
Doctrine and its flawed strategies and failed policies. 
Absent that crucial precondition, there is little likeli-
hood that allies will provide more human and mate-
rial resources and incur increased political obligations 
at home and abroad to turn the tide in Afghanistan. 
Nor are they likely to be disposed to fashion new 
institutions capable of the needed levels of coopera-
tion to address their shared global interests.
Specifically, the incoming administration must jet-
tison the misguided assumption, shared by the Right 
and the Left and reflected in the campaign rhetoric 
of both parties and candidates, that the United 
States is a superpower. It cannot impose its prefer-
ences for global order on other states and peoples 
or induce them to bandwagon on American power 
and purposes. Abandoning the notion of a compel-
ling American hegemony in no way diminishes the 
United States as a formidable global power. It is des-
tined neither inexorably to decline and demise nor, as 
others suggest, to triumph over history as the world’s 
populations were expected to inevitably embrace its 
liberal credo.1
Like the United States, other global powers—
China, India, and an incipiently uniting European 
Union—are also incapable, alone and unilaterally, 
either of eliciting universal support for their preferred 
notions of global order or of compelling others 
to adopt or to adapt to them. The costly civil and 
international wars of the twentieth century—many 
still ongoing—clearly frustrated those ambitions. The 
emergence of a global society for the first time in the 
evolution of the species precludes them.
The diffusion of power among the multiple and 
multiplying actors of the world society is beyond the 
capacity of any state or people to capture or control. 
This revolutionary human condition is the unin-
tended outcome of a long, trial-and-error globalizing 
process of socio-economic and political engagement. 
The existence of this society is now consciously 
acknowledged and understood by a growing number 
of the world’s increasingly entangled and contesting 
states and peoples.2 The challenge confronting the 
United States and the democratic coalition is to pool 
their resources and power to ensure their collec-
tive leadership of the six billion diverse and divided 
peoples of the world whose fates and fortunes have 
never been so interdependently entwined.
Two long-term policy goals should be pursued 
to reverse the catastrophic consequences of the Bush 
Doctrine in weakening American influence and 
power, soft and hard, around the globe, in mindlessly 
squandering scarce human and material resources 
better spent on strengthening the domestic fabric of 
the nation, and in damaging, arguably permanently, 
the moral integrity of the United States and Ameri-
can people.
First, the Atlantic Alliance should be enlarged and 
transformed into an Alliance of Democratic States 
and Peoples. Second, this alliance should build on 
the military assets of the NATO organization. These 
include NATO’s integrated organization, planning, 
and command structures, its formidable military 
capabilities and capacity for conducting joint opera-
tions, the professional competence of its officer and 
enlisted corps, and the hard-earned mutual respect 
that cooperation among national militaries, engaged 
on the battle field, engenders among allies. An 
expanded alliance would be supplemented by the cre-
ation of a truly effective European Union rapid strike 
force of global reach, a capability that still eludes a 
EU population greater than that of the United States 
and with a Gross Domestic Product roughly equal 
to it.
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This process of inclusion of democratic peoples 
around the world is intended to bring Australia, New 
Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and other democratic 
or aspiring democratic states into this global alliance 
of free states and peoples. The realization of this 
alliance will not be achieved any time soon. The 
splits within the democratic coalition, exacerbated by 
the Bush Doctrine, are presently too deep; the lures 
of free riding too compelling. Recognition of the 
urgent necessity of this alliance can only arise from 
a clear-headed diagnosis of the failure of a divided 
democratic coalition to cope with multiplying and 
synergistically reinforcing global issues. Let’s begin 
with Afghanistan.
Surviving Afghanistan?
Afghanistan is a global challenge. It is not simply an 
out-of-area NATO mission. Obscured in reduc-
ing Afghanistan to a NATO military operation are 
the global dimensions of the Afghan war and their 
implications for the coalition of democratic states. 
The Western democracies emerged ascendant from 
the Cold War as the collective hegemon of global 
politics. The Cold War struggle, dating as early as the 
outbreak of World War II, posed the issues of what 
global order, economic system, and political and 
moral values would inform the states and regimes of 
the world. With the defeat of imperial, fascist, Nazi, 
and Communist solutions to these issues by a coali-
tion of democratic states, led by the United States, 
it was convenient and comforting to believe that the 
governance of the world was resolved definitively in 
favor of this powerful coalition of free peoples. What 
is now clear to even the casual observer of global dis-
array is that the issue of how the world will be ruled 
remains the overriding challenge of this century. 
While the Afghan war does not pose all of the 
obstacles and constraints impeding the realization of 
a democratically dominated and –led global society, 
it does raise formidable challenges that must be 
adequately addressed if the democratic coalition is to 
survive and thrive. Afghanistan is a failed state from 
the perspective of a Western-oriented global society. 
Its political disintegration after over a generation of 
wars facilitated the Taliban’s highjack of the Afghan 
state and its imposition of a rigid, socially retrograde 
system of rule on the Afghan people.3
There arose an affinity of Taliban ideology with al 
Qaeda’s pogrom of nihilistic violence against the West 
and, specifically, against the American people. In the 
immediate wake of 9/11, Americans and Europeans 
instinctively grasped the import of the attack on the 
World Trade Center. As Le Monde proclaimed: “Nous 
sommes tous Americains.” The Bush administration 
squandered the opportunity to capitalize on this 
transatlantic recognition of a shared threat to the 
Western project and of the need of open societies to 
join forces to protect their vulnerable populations. 
Their very openness exposes them to terrorists bent 
on random mass murder, driven by a singular pursuit 
of weapons of mass destruction.
Now that NATO and in varying degrees most 
of its members are committed in principle, if not in 
policy, to the goal of a stable, functioning govern-
ment in Afghanistan, capable of resisting a resurgent 
Taliban and al Qaeda, the power of the democratic 
coalition to lead the world’s populations is ipso facto 
at stake. Failure to achieve this feasible aim, if not 
necessarily a fully functioning democratic Afghani-
stan, can only serve to embolden not only the Taliban 
and al Qaeda but anti-democratic and anti-market 
forces everywhere. These include opponents of 
Western values within Western states themselves, as 
the Jihadist attacks in Britain, Spain, and the Neth-
erlands evidence. These subversive cells might well 
flourish were there no Taliban or al Qaeda. A defeat 
in Afghanistan would provide evidence for these 
opponents that free peoples lack the means, will, and 
moral certainty to suppress them.
There is also the problem of drugs. Afghani-
stan has now become one of the principal global 
sources of heroin. These poisonous substances 
infect all Western societies. Their damaging effects 
are pervasive, debilitating populations, notably the 
young, spreading crime, and nurturing gangs. The 
revenues from drugs sustain the Taliban insurgency 
and finance al Qaeda’s global operations. Absent a 
reliable security system for Afghanistan and the socio-
economic development of the Afghan people—the 
indispensable conditions to win the support of the 
Afghan population to sustain a stable Afghanistan 
aligned on Western interests—there is little likelihood 
that the drug war will be won. 
Perhaps the most important reason to concen-
trate on the creation of a global democratic coali-
tion rather than limit the focus to a NATO military 
mission is the long-term challenge of reconciling a 
largely secular West with Islam. The coalition of free, 
Western states confronts the emergence of a much-
delayed Islamic reformation,4 partially explained as a 
response to the millennial ascendancy of the Western 
coalition.5 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
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abrupt end of the Cold War, as the dominant axis 
around which global politics revolved and evolved, 
opened the way for these hitherto suppressed global 
forces to be pushed to the forefront of the world 
society’s principal concerns.
It is important to recognize what history and 
human social evolution has produced: a world society 
profoundly divided by religion, culture, national, 
ethnic, and tribal loyalties, language, gender, status 
and race. To get its way on the urgent global issues 
of today—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
sustainable economic growth, the end of poverty and 
gross income inequality, or ecological and environ-
mental protection—the democratic coalition must 
work through this resistant material to elicit the 
cooperation of other actors, whether by consent or, if 
blandishments and threats fail, by force. There is no 
clear endpoint to what is a dual process of politi-
cal engagement. Through ongoing negotiations and 
give-and-take, the coalition confronts two challenges: 
to develop a consensus about what and how to shape 
and shove a seemingly intractable world society to its 
advantage, while sustaining that consensus through 
expected setbacks and defeats wrought by non-dem-
ocratic opponents. Either the states and peoples will 
hang together or they will hang separately.
how democratic states solve the Afghanistan 
conundrum will have a significant impact on produc-
ing the favorable political conditions to collectively 
confront their shared issues of the global commons. 
Specifically, the virulent and violent forms of Islamic 
Jihad must not only be defeated by force but in a way 
that does not galvanize the larger Islamic community 
stretching from North Africa to Southeast Asia to 
coalesce in opposition to the West. That apocalyptic 
future, predicted by some prominent theorists and 
practitioners,6 need not come to pass. It will take a 
mighty effort of a democratic coalition, leaders and 
their populations, to preclude that dismal outcome. 
The example of Turkey, as an Islamic society and 
secular state, holds promise that an Islamic nation 
can become a prominent and valued member of a 
democratic coalition and an effective bridge between 
different cultures. Most recently, Turkey is playing 
that role in offering its good offices to resolve differ-
ences between Syria and Israel.
The Limited Capacity of NATO in Its Current 
Form to Produce a Stable Afghanistan
On several fronts, NATO is falling short of what 
is needed to protect the Afghan population from 
Taliban and al Qaeda attacks and rule. According to 
the assessment of senior American officials, including 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, and President Bush, NATO is not 
doing a very good job at present in Afghanistan. They 
have admonished NATO members to devote more 
human and material resources and political capital to 
the fight. Most NATO states are free riders on those 
allies, which have troops, deployed in Afghanistan. 
Canada, with the largest non-American military con-
tingent next to the United Kingdom in Afghanistan, 
threatened to withdraw its forces unless other NATO 
states increased their commitments. Of the 62,000 
foreign troops in Afghanistan, approximately 33,000 
are American and the remainder is a wide scattering 
of NATO and non-NATO troops. An additional 
7,000 American troops are expected to be deployed 
in early 2009, bringing the total of U.S. fighting 
forces to 40,000.7 
By all accounts these forces are too small to cope 
with a resurgent Taliban in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan. American troop levels cannot be 
appreciably increased because most American combat 
forces are bogged down in Iraq. Multiple deploy-
ments of these troops have further stretched U.S. 
fighting forces available to Afghanistan. The recent 
decision not to draw down additional levels in Iraq 
for the immediate future decreases the likelihood 
that substantial numbers of American troops will be 
sent to Afghanistan besides the small contingent of 
marines that have been recently dispatched and the 
7,000 scheduled for 2009. 
The shortfalls are not only in numbers. The split 
command between NATO and American special 
forces complicates the coordination and efficient 
deployment of NATO-American military assets. 
The turnover in NATO and American commanders 
suggests, too, that officers are rotated out at about the 
time that they are gaining some understanding and 
control of the security problems their forces confront.
These limitations imposed by NATO states on 
their participation in the Afghan war say volumes 
about the weakness of the Western response. The 
so-called caveats attached to the German, Italian, and 
Spanish forces forestall their being assigned to combat 
missions. These states claim to be contributing to 
the NATO mission, largely by occupying relatively 
safe havens in Afghanistan, overseeing Provisional 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and providing rela-
tively modest developmental assistance to Afghans. 
Most of the actual troop contributions of participat-
ing coalition partners are fewer than 100 personnel. 
This amounts to little more than a symbolic gesture 
to assuage American frustrations about the adequacy 
of the NATO effort than an effective contribution 
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to ensure Afghanistan’s security and the stability of 
the Kabul government. The creation of Provisional 
Reconstruction Teams to address the non-military 
and reconstruction needs of Afghans throughout the 
country is laudable, but their number, ad hoc prolif-
eration, and the modest-sized programs they support 
do not add up to a comprehensive, integrated, and 
effective socio-economic development program for 
Afghanistan as a whole.
To these drawbacks must be added the failure 
of the Karzai government to extend its control over 
the country. National and local police forces and the 
Afghan National Army are not equipped to provide 
security or combat the Taliban alone in the south 
and east of the country, nor seal Pakistan’s western 
border. Tribal communities there provide sanctuary 
and bases for Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. The 
siphoning off of aid funds to corrupt officials and 
warlords further hampers the successful achievement 
of a stable Afghanistan, torn by centuries of ethnic 
conflict. Widespread corruption undercuts the gov-
ernment’s ability to deliver secure and needed services 
to the population and undermines the legitimacy 
of the Karzai regime. Reports that Afghanistan will 
be secure by 2011, issuing from NATO command-
ers,8 could be viewed as correctives to this skeptical 
evaluation of progress in Afghanistan. Facts on the 
ground in Afghanistan contradict these optimistic 
projections. 
The Precondition for an Enhanced Footprint 
of an Enlarged Democratic Coalition in 
Afghanistan: Rejection of the Bush Doctrine
If the United States and the American people are to 
restore the damaged and, in some quarters, the lost 
confidence in American leadership of the demo-
cratic coalition, the assumptions about American 
power and purpose—outlined in the White house 
publication of the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of September 2002 and re-affirmed in 
20069—have to be radically revised. American power 
must be calibrated to what is possible, not to what 
might be desirable. The formidable reach of Ameri-
can power must be one within its grasp.
There is little doubt that the implementation of 
the Bush Doctrine, most notably in Iraq but hardly 
limited to that folly, has had serious adverse impacts 
on Western cohesion. The Bush administration chose 
to accept a split in the NATO alliance, between 
old and new Europe as Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld observed, to effect the Iraqi invasion. 
In counterpoint, it cobbled together a transitory 
“coalition of the willing” to legitimate its overthrow 
of the Saddam hussein regime in the face of U.N. 
and widespread European opposition. This defection 
from reliable alliance behavior has had the predict-
able effect of seeding widespread doubt and division 
within the democratic coalition. These rifts, grave 
enough on pure policy grounds of effectiveness, have 
been widened and deepened by two other factors: 
the Bush administration’s deliberate lack of candor 
about its specific policy aims in Iraq and its gross 
incompetence in managing the aftermath of the Iraqi 
invasion.10 
What were key changes in the assumptions made 
about the reach of American power and what were 
some of its major effects, well beyond the disastrous 
intervention into Iraq, that were rationalized by the 
Doctrine? The National Security document and 
speeches of the President, the Vice-President and 
their top advisors, notably President Bush’s address 
to the graduating class of West Point in the spring 
of 2002, provide a wide window into the adminis-
tration’s thinking, its global strategy, particularly in 
using and threatening American military power, and 
its ambitious plans to transform world order to its 
liking.11 
The Doctrine assumed that the U.S. was a 
superpower, capable of imposing its preferences on 
rivals or inducing allies to bandwagon on them. The 
President’s West Point speech mapped his vision of 
an American global order. The President stipulated 
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that the United States was in the unprecedented 
position, since the rise of the nation-state in the 
seventeenth century, to create a balance of power 
favoring peace over war. This claim was later echoed 
in the National Security paper, which affirmed that 
the United States was poised by its unmatched mili-
tary power to “create a balance of power that favors 
human freedom; conditions in which all nations and 
all societies can choose for themselves the rewards 
and challenges of political and economic liberty.”12 
The unsurpassed military power of the United States 
could not be balanced by any one state or combina-
tion of states. The President spelled out the global 
implications of American military supremacy:
 Competition between great nations is inevi-
table, but armed conflict in our world is not. 
More and more, civilized nations find our-
selves on the same side—united by common 
dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. 
America has, and intends to keep, military 
strengths beyond challenge—(applause)—
thereby, making the destabilizing arms races 
of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to 
trade and other pursuits of peace.13
Based on this assumption of undisputed and 
uncontestable military prowess, the defensive strate-
gies of the past that relied on containing adversaries 
and deterring them from using force against Ameri-
can and allied interests were no longer serviceable. 
First, American power would be used for the collec-
tive good of the international system, and not simply 
for the realization of discrete American national inter-
ests. The President stipulated that American power 
was no threat to free and peace-loving states, scarcely 
reassuring to some key NATO allies like France and 
Germany, which opposed the Iraqi war.
Second, and in response to the 9/11 disaster, 
foreign adversaries, both state and non-state actors, 
would not be deterred by the Cold War strategies of 
the past. Instead, the United States would be obliged 
to rely on a strategy of pre-emption and, by exten-
sion, preventive war to preclude terrorist attacks 
before they could arise. These perpetrators were 
judged to be inured to deterrence threats, since they 
were prepared to commit suicide in attacking Ameri-
can and Western strategic targets and vulnerable 
cities. The potential link between terrorists and their 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction advised a 
fundamental shift in U.S. strategy.
The President explained why the shift from deter-
rence to pre-emption was imperative:
The United States has long maintained the 
option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk 
of inaction—and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, 
act preemptively.14
Then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice 
added urgency to this shift when she observed on 
September 8, 2002, that “the problem here is that 
there will always be some uncertainty about how 
quickly [Saddam] can acquire nuclear weapons. But 
we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom 
cloud.”15
Three principled justifications were advanced 
for this strategic reformulation. The first was drawn 
from the nation-state system of sovereign states, each 
possessing an inherent right to use force to protect 
national interests and survival. The second was more 
expansive. If, by the President’s reckoning, the inter-
national community was either unwilling or unable 
to defend itself, the United States had a legitimate 
right and moral obligation to act on its behalf and 
provide this collective good. 
A third, more compelling and unprecedented 
objective was the transformation of the global secu-
rity order by extending democratic rule around the 
world. American military forces could be effectively 
and legitimately used to achieve this revolutionary 
reform to free oppressed peoples. Peace, too, would 
be advanced, because democratic states were alleged 
to eschew force in resolving their differences. The 
liberal Wilsonian ideal of global order and peace, 
based on a league of democratically governed nation-
states, was resurrected by a politically conservative 
administration that put military muscle into this 
vision. The United States, as the world’s sole super-
power, could unilaterally get its way to ensure the 
spread of freedom and peace.
The strategic logic, if not political prudence, of 
the Bush Doctrine required maximal flexibility and 
minimal restraint on the use of American might. 
This imperative explains in no small degree why the 
administration felt compelled either to renounce 
previously established treaty commitments, like the 
ABM treaty with Russia, or to pointedly reject the 
entreaties of the international community to join the 
Kyoto Accord, the International Criminal Court, the 
12 Office of the President, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (2002), Introduction.
13 President Bush’s speech to the graduating class at West 
Point, June 1, 2002.
14 Office of the President, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (2002), p. 15.
15 Quoted in McClellan, p. 6.
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 American power is never 
greater than when it binds 
itself by treaty commitments, 
widely practiced norms of 
civil conduct, the strictures 
of international law and 
moral restraint, and the rule 
of law at home.
 It is appropriate to 
characterize this military 
operation as the incipient 
operational representation 
of an expanded NATO—a 
Global NATO.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and treaties to ban 
biological and chemical weapons, land mines, and 
cluster bombs. International, Constitutional, and 
legal restraints of any kind hobbled the President’s 
exercise of American power in his self-proclaimed 
global war on terror.
The Bush administration also unilaterally 
amended the Non-Proliferation treaty by signing an 
accord, yet to be ratified by the Senate and the Indian 
Parliament, to provide nuclear materials and know-
how to India, a non-signatory of the NPT, in return 
for New Delhi’s pledge to place its civilian nuclear 
program under International Atomic Energy Agency 
full-scope inspection, while exempting its military 
nuclear facilities from the same obligation. These 
moves to dismiss hard-won international understand-
ings and to act unilaterally over the opposition of 
key NATO allies and members of the U.N. Security 
Council were consistent with Bush Doctrine strategic 
principles and political aims to assert and reinforce 
what has proven to be a false claim of superpower 
and hegemonic status of the international system and 
global politics. 
In retrospect, it should come as no surprise that 
the Bush administration rejected NATO’s offer to 
assist the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and ignored 
the invocation of Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance 
Treaty for the first time in the history of the pact 
that an attack on one state was an attack on all. 
The administration and its civilian leadership of the 
military were convinced that the Europeans had little 
to offer that was not already available to the United 
States in military capabilities. European participa-
tion would also constrain the use of American power 
wherever and whenever it was needed and in what 
amounts. 
Notwithstanding recent signs by the administra-
tion to distance itself from some of its extreme claims 
of unilateralism, witnessed in demands for NATO 
and allied support for the war in Afghanistan and 
in subsequent negotiations with North Korea to 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program, the Bush 
Doctrine is still embedded in the thinking and strate-
gies of the administration.16 This has a dual damaging 
effect on NATO cohesion and support for the Afghan 
war and for cooperation on other important global 
issues. First, the members of NATO cannot assume, 
as they could during the Cold War, that the U.S. 
would be a reliable partner. Before, they could act on 
the assumption that, by and large, American policy 
would take into account their particular security 
concerns and interests. The United States would act 
through consensus, not coercion, in using its power.17 
NATO allies could also expect—lapses like Vietnam 
or Star Wars notwithstanding—that the United States 
would not act in ways that would be a direct threat to 
their security interests and aims.
Second, while terrorism and terrorists were, 
indeed, threats to the security interests of all NATO 
allies, many were prompted to view the United States 
as a rogue state rather than the Bush administra-
tion’s axis of evil (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea). This 
view cannot be said to have arisen from any one 
action taken by the Bush administration. It was the 
accumulation of initiatives in implementing the Bush 
Doctrine that gradually weakened the democratic 
coalition and inflamed international public opinion 
against the United States. 
The catalogue of Bush administration defections 
from traditional American foreign and security poli-
cies is long and disquieting: the invasion of Iraq on 
grounds later proved wrong, notably the connection 
of the hussein regime to 9/11; the gross misman-
agement of the occupation; the many documented 
abuses of human rights, involving the torture of 
combatants at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and other 
prison facilities under U.S. control; the lengthy 
detentions of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo 
without formal charges being brought against them 
in violation of the Geneva Convention and inter-
national law; the creation of special military courts 
to try detainees at odds with traditional American 
legal practices; the rendition of prisoners to their 
homelands where they faced torture, imprison-
ment, and execution; secret prisons in complicit 
NATO countries; and the continued insistence of 
the President that he alone is the final judge of what 
constitutes torture under international norms and 
legal proscriptions.18
A clean break with the hegemonic and expan-
sionist assumptions of the Bush Doctrine and its 
privileged reliance on a pre-emptive strategy of its 
own making is a necessary, if not sufficient, move 
to restore some of the lost confidence and respect of 
NATO allies and other democratic states and peoples 
in the United States. As long as the Bush Doctrine 
remains the announced strategy of the United States, 
allies will continue to harbor reservations about 
how closely they wish to align on U.S. power and 
will set conditions, as Germany, Italy, and Spain 
have done, in contributing to the Afghan war and 
reconstruction.
16 Seymour hersh provides recent evidence: Seymour M. 
hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield: The Administration’s Secret 
Iran Campaign,” New Yorker (July 7, 2008): 60-67.
17 See the Chapter by Trine Flockhart, on U.S.-European 
security relations in NATO during the Cold War in From 
Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order 
after the Failure of the Bush Doctrine, n. 11, pp. 137-154.
18 Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presi-
dency and the Subversion of American Democracy (New york: 
Little, Brown, 2007).
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 To effectively grapple 
with global issues, there is 
a need to negotiate a grand 
bargain between the demo-
cratic states and peoples.
 The Afghan war is but 
one significant sector of a 
global battleground between 
democratic-market states 
and peoples and antagonistic 
forces that extends to every 
continent.
Even with the jettisoning of the Bush Doctrine, 
a return to the mutual confidence that characterized 
European-U.S. security relations during the Cold 
War will not be automatic. Nor can previous levels 
of strategic cooperation be easily achieved under 
conditions of a global society of complex interde-
pendencies of states and peoples. Threats today are 
greater in number and more diffused that that of a 
possible Soviet attack on Europe. The Bush Doctrine 
can be credited with having attempted to develop a 
global strategy for the twenty-first century. It was the 
right step, but in the wrong direction. It has fallen 
woefully short in pivoting that strategy narrowly 
around a global war on terror—a tactic rather than a 
defined political threat. An adversary can be defeated; 
terrorism, as a tactic of the weak, cannot. Meanwhile, 
an effective strategy to address the many challenges to 
open societies, as noted earlier, has yet to be devised.
The record of U.S.-allied cooperation during 
the Cold War reveals a seeming paradox. American 
power is never greater than when it binds itself to 
treaty commitments, widely practiced norms of civil 
conduct, the strictures of international law and moral 
restraint, and the rule of law at home. It relinquishes 
influence when the American government acts uni-
laterally in pursuit of narrowly conceived American 
security and global interests, unmindful of the dam-
aging impacts of American power on allies and on the 
people of the United States. Jack Goldsmith, a former 
Justice Department Assistant Attorney General who 
defected from administration policies on torture, 
forcefully makes this latter point.19
Transforming NATO from a Transatlantic Alliance 
to an Alliance of Democratic States and Peoples
If the object of the Afghanistan war and the defeat 
of the Taliban and al Qaeda are understood as a 
challenge—not just to NATO, but to the coalition 
of democratic, open market states dedicated to the 
protection and promotion of human rights—then it 
is misleading to reduce the stakes of the war to “Will 
NATO survive Afghanistan?” Some NATO allies 
appear to grasp its global dimensions. If the mili-
tary make up of the Afghan coalition is parsed, it is 
readily apparent that the forces of some non-NATO 
countries, like the Australian contingent, are signifi-
cant. Included are contributions from New Zealand, 
Japan, and Sweden and, until recently, Switzerland 
and South Korea (the latter having withdrawn its 
troops in a swap deal for South Korean citizens held 
hostage by the Taliban). These states and all open 
societies have a stake in the outcome of the war and 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
Then why an expanded military alliance patterned 
on the NATO model? First, the experience in joint 
planning, operations, command, communications 
and control, and weapons development and acquisi-
tion are very precious, scarce resources available to 
the democratic states. The military of NATO states 
can do a lot. As Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier 
remind us, NATO can “deliver supplies to disaster 
zones and evacuate the injured; command, control 
and reconnaissance capabilities to sustain peacekeep-
ing missions; and experienced military officers to 
train local security forces.”20 
An expanded NATO of democratic states and 
peoples can do more than discharge these important 
local security functions and humanitarian efforts. 
If the shaky coalition hastily organized to meet the 
Taliban/al Qaeda challenge waddles and quacks like a 
duck, then it must be a duck; that is, it seems appro-
priate to characterize this military operation as the 
incipient operational representation of an expanded 
NATO—a global NATO in the words of Daalder 
and Goldgeier. 
The difficulty of reforming and enlarging the 
NATO military organization should not be under-
estimated. The coalition of democratic states which 
would be parties to the alliance have, even in its 
present form of twenty-six states, widely different 
conceptions of the security threats they confront, the 
strategies and military capabilities required to address 
them, and the bearing of costs and burdens that each 
would shoulder to underwrite an effective strategy. 
The utility of an expanded alliance is the existence of 
an institutional framework to thrash out these differ-
ences and to develop military contingency plans that 
take account of these differences in the perception 
and salience of security threats without paralyzing the 
capacity of democratic peoples to defend their shared 
interests. 
It is paramount to underline the shared inter-
est of free people to retain their ascendancy within 
a fractious and fractured world society. The more 
than one billion members of states and societies that 
meet a democratic/human rights test—two billion 
if India is included—will inhabit a planet of nine 
to ten billion in less than a half decade. This zone 
of freedom and openness is not a free good but 
demands the continued attention and commitment 
of its members. NATO, as it is now organized, is not 
equipped, alone, to confront the many challenges of 
a global society and its increasingly complex politics 
and challenges. These go well beyond military threats 
to encompass international crime, ecological degrada-
tion, and sustainable economic growth to respond 
19 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment 
inside the Bush Administration (New york: Norton, 2007).
20 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign 
Affairs (September/October 2006): 105-114.
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to the demands of populations for “more now,” most 
notably by those two and half billion people who 
presently live on less than $2 a day. To effectively 
grapple with these global issues, there is a need to 
start now on negotiating a grand bargain between the 
democratic states and peoples that, while recognizing 
their particular interests, also strengthens their collec-
tive will to get the world they want.
Conclusion
Although historical analogies limit themselves, it may 
still be useful to reflect on the creative response of 
the democratic states of the Atlantic coalition to the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union after World War 
II.21 From a global perspective, the issue was joined 
on the question of how an emerging world society, 
negatively reflected in the global reach and destruc-
tive power of a violent world war, would be ordered: 
whether organized around authoritarian Communist 
parties and centrally directed economic systems or 
around open, democratic regimes founded on free 
economic exchange markets and dedicated to the 
protection and promotion of human rights. 
The Atlantic Alliance and later the NATO mili-
tary organization were the security guarantee of the 
democratic coalition within the confining limits of 
the Cold War struggle. The implosion of the Soviet 
Union and China’s break with centralized economic 
planning confirmed its ascendancy in world politics. 
That coalition is now again under stress by anti-
democratic and anti-market forces. The Afghan war 
is but one significant sector of a global battleground 
between these antagonistic forces and democratic-
market states and peoples that extends to every 
continent. The logical consequence of this transfor-
mation of global politics and the shared interests of 
democratic peoples is to organize a military coalition 
to suit their interests and the times.
QED: If the threats confronting democracies 
are global, not just that of a big power, like a once 
formidable Soviet Union, then NATO should be 
transformed into a global alliance and military 
organization of free, democratic, market states and 
peoples to confront their shared global threats and, 
just as importantly, to seize opportunities to advance 
their collective interests and values to ensure their 
leadership of a world society at sixes and sevens.
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